Dwelling and Habitus: Heideggerian Ontology and Bourdieusian Sociology in Dialogue

The relation between Martin Heidegger’s concept of dwelling and Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of habitus can be illuminated by recognising that both are attempts, within different disciplines and vocabularies, to describe how human beings are formed by and form the worlds they inhabit. Heidegger’s notion of dwelling, especially in his later work, names the existential way in which mortals are “on the earth,” cultivating and preserving a meaningful world through their everyday being-in-place; Bourdieu’s habitus, developed in a sociological register, describes the durable, embodied dispositions through which social structures become second nature and generate practices, perceptions, and values.[^1]¹² Dwelling and habitus converge in their emphasis on spatiality, embodiment, and the non‑thematic, practical familiarity through which a world is lived rather than merely represented; yet they diverge insofar as Heidegger’s dwelling is an ontological-existential structure grounded in the fourfold of earth, sky, divinities, and mortals, whereas Bourdieu’s habitus is a socio‑historical, class‑differentiated system of dispositions that mediates between objective structures and practice.[^1]¹² Bringing them into critical relation allows us to see, on the one hand, that dwelling always already has a social and historical “style” akin to habitus, and on the other hand, that habitus can be interpreted as a historically specific “mode of dwelling” that shapes how people feel at home or estranged in particular spaces.[^1]³²

In what follows, I will first reconstruct Heidegger’s concept of dwelling, with particular attention to its spatial, bodily, and communal dimensions. I will then explicate Bourdieu’s concept of habitus, emphasising its spatial metaphors, embodied character, and generative role in everyday life as described in the reference texts.[^1]¹²⁴ On this basis, I will develop a detailed comparative analysis along four axes: spatiality, embodiment and memory, normativity and social reproduction, and creativity and change. Finally, I will propose a way of thinking habitus as a social “style of dwelling,” while also showing how Heidegger’s ontological account of dwelling can help us interrogate the limits and blind spots of Bourdieu’s structural sociology, and vice versa.

Heidegger’s Concept of Dwelling: Being-in-the-World, Place, and the Fourfold

Dwelling as the Essence of Being-in-the-World

Heidegger’s concept of dwelling emerges gradually from his early analysis of being-in-the-world in Being and Time and is thematically foregrounded in later essays such as “Building Dwelling Thinking.” In his mature formulation, dwelling is not an optional activity added to a pre‑given subject, but names the basic character of human existence (Dasein).⁵⁵ To say that dwelling is “the essence of ‘being-in-the-world’” is to claim that our very way of existing consists in inhabiting a world of meanings, relations, and places, rather than merely occupying an abstract physical space.⁵⁵

The Stanford Encyclopedia exposition of Heidegger’s later work underlines this shift by noting that dwelling comes to name a form of existence in which humans take responsibility for disclosing their local world and embracing the plural forms of life it harbours.⁵⁵ Dwelling is thus inseparable from Heidegger’s rethinking of “world” not as a collection of objects in neutral space, but as that “wherein” Dasein lives, a holistic structure of significance that is always already shared with others.⁶ In his early ontology, being‑in‑the‑world is co‑constituted by affective disposedness, understanding, and discourse, which together make up our practical familiarity with a world; to be “at home” in such a world is precisely to have mastered the skills and interpretations that allow us to respond appropriately to the typical situations we encounter.⁶ This existential familiarity foreshadows what Heidegger will later call dwelling.

A crucial step in this development is Heidegger’s critique of the idea that human beings simply exist “in” space as objects among others. As phenomenological discussions of his theory of spatiality emphasise, Heidegger distinguishes between being “in” space in the sense of mere objective location and being spatial in the existential sense of being situated through concernful involvement with things, places, and others.⁷⁸ Dasein’s spatiality is defined not by coordinates but by de‑severance (bringing things near through concern) and directionality (oriented involvement), such that “to ‘be’ is to dwell.”⁷⁸ Dwelling, in this sense, is the way in which Dasein’s embodied existence “makes room” for itself in a meaningful world, giving space to things and others through involvement.⁷ Already here, the seeds of an affinity with Bourdieu’s interest in lived spatiality can be discerned, even if the philosophical orientations differ.

Building, Dwelling, Thinking: Dwelling as Letting-Dwell

Heidegger’s later essay “Building Dwelling Thinking” develops dwelling explicitly in relation to building, language, and the fourfold.³⁹ Against the instrumental assumption that we first build and then dwell, Heidegger argues that building is in itself already a form of dwelling and that we build because we are dwellers, not the other way around.³⁹ The German word bauen, he suggests, originally means “to dwell,” and from this etymology he draws three interlinked claims: building is dwelling, dwelling is the manner in which mortals are on the earth, and building as dwelling unfolds into both the cultivation of growing things and the erection of constructed buildings.³⁹

Dwelling, in this later perspective, is defined by what Heidegger calls sparing and preserving.³⁹ To dwell is “to be set at peace,” which means to remain within a free sphere that safeguards each thing in its nature; the fundamental character of dwelling is this sparing and preserving.³⁹ Dwelling “keeps” or “secures” the fourfold—earth, sky, divinities, and mortals—in the things among which mortals stay.⁹⁵ Earth names the ground and materiality of our abode; sky names the cycles, climate, and horizons under which life unfolds; divinities represent the sacred or normative ideals that shine within a culture; and mortals name our own finite, historical condition.⁵

Building, in turn, is understood as a distinctive letting‑dwell.³⁹ By raising locations and joining spaces, building allows the fourfold to gather and take place in particular things and places, so that mortals can inhabit them meaningfully.⁹⁵ Genuine buildings thus give form to dwelling in its presencing and house this presence; they do not merely provide shelter, but articulate and conserve a way of being‑at‑home in the world.³⁹ To be capable of dwelling is therefore a precondition for building: “Only if we are capable of dwelling, only then can we build.”³⁹

This re‑orientation has important implications. Dwelling is not reducible to residing in a house or having a roof; one can inhabit a building without genuinely dwelling there, in Heidegger’s sense.³[^1] Dwelling is a way of being attuned to and caring for the fourfold as it is disclosed in a particular place. It is therefore possible to be homeless even when one is “housed,” if one’s relations to earth, sky, divinities, and mortals are distorted by a technological enframing that turns everything into resources devoid of world‑disclosing power.⁵ This critique of homelessness anticipates, in a very different idiom, Bourdieu’s analysis of how modern institutions shape and often misrecognise the conditions of our belonging.

Poetic Dwelling, Belongingness, and Being-at-Home

The later Heidegger associates dwelling with a specifically poetic mode of existence. Poetic dwelling means being at home in a place because we recognise and care about what is essential to its unique character.⁵⁵ It involves a “poetic sensitivity and openness to other possible meanings,” such that we are receptive to the shining of what really matters in our form of life.⁵⁵ The call to dwell poetically is thus not a call to aestheticise existence superficially, but to take measure of life by letting a sense of the sacred, or of what is genuinely worthy, shape our practices.⁵⁵

In this context, Heidegger reconceives homeland (Heimat). Being at home no longer means being comfortably embedded in a familiar ethnic or national culture; to dwell is to live “in the nearness to Being,” which requires openness to a plurality of different ways to be.⁵⁵ Dwelling therefore includes a dimension of uncanniness and non‑coincidence with any fixed social identity, echoing the earlier analysis in Being and Time of Dasein’s not-being-at-home in the everyday world of the “they” (das Man).⁶¹⁰⁵ Yet, as studies of Heidegger’s reflections on belongingness stress, his notion of being at home in the world remains deeply concerned with overcoming the alienation of modern individualism and articulating forms of shared life that sustain a sense of rootedness without collapsing into closed, homogenising identities.¹¹⁵⁵

Poetic dwellers, according to this interpretation, are engaged in conserving their world.⁵⁵ Conserving is not mere preservation of the status quo; it involves actively creating and maintaining the infrastructure—buildings, institutions, practices—that sustains a particular form of life, while discerning and protecting what is exemplary and worth saving within it.⁵⁵ To dwell well thus requires building in a broad sense: cultivating, producing, and arranging things in ways that safeguard the character of a place.³⁹⁵⁵ We may already hear resonances with Bourdieu’s idea that institutions, especially the family, education, and work, play a central role in transmitting and reproducing the habitus that shapes practices and world‑views.[^1]¹²¹ The difference is that Heidegger frames this as a primarily ontological and normative question—what it means to live in a way that is responsive to Being—whereas Bourdieu frames it in terms of power, domination, and social reproduction.

A further bridge between dwelling and habitus can be found in Heidegger’s analysis of social spatiality. Phenomenological reinterpretations of his notion of space emphasise that Dasein is not a placeless ego but is situated in social space and conceptualised through its engagement in the world.⁷⁸ Dasein is “in” the world through being-with-others (Mitsein), and its spatiality is inseparable from its social embeddedness.⁷⁶ The concept of dwelling thus already contains a social dimension: to dwell is to inhabit social spaces, to be conditioned by norms and practices, and to participate in shared ways of making room for things and others.⁷⁶

Heidegger’s concept of being-with suggests that dwelling always includes a communal aspect: we are never solitary builders of our worlds, but co‑dwellers whose sense of home is shaped by the habits, expectations, and norms of others.⁶¹⁰ Later commentators emphasise that alienation in Heidegger’s sense is connected not only to technological enframing but also to distortions of our being-with, such as conformist absorption into das Man or individualistic flight from community.⁶¹⁰⁵ Authentic dwelling would require a critical engagement with these social forms, an engagement that brings Heidegger closer to the sociological concerns of Bourdieu than is sometimes acknowledged.

With this sketch of dwelling in place, we can now turn to Bourdieu’s concept of habitus, which arises from a very different problematic—namely, how to explain social practice and reproduction without falling into either rigid structuralism or an over‑voluntaristic notion of agency—but which nonetheless shares with Heidegger an emphasis on embodied, spatially situated, pre‑reflective ways of being in the world.

Habitus as Embodied, Durable, and Generative Dispositions

Bourdieu introduced the concept of habitus as the keystone of his “theory of practice,” intended to reconcile the influence of social structures with the creativity of individual action.¹²⁴¹² Habitus refers to systems of durable, transposable dispositions—ways of perceiving, thinking, feeling, and acting—that are internalised from one’s social environment and that guide practices without requiring conscious rule‑following.¹²¹²¹³ It is, in his oft‑quoted formula, a set of “structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures,” which means that habitus is shaped by past conditions while also generating practices that reproduce or transform those very conditions.¹³¹⁴

The reference materials underscore that Bourdieu explicitly frames habitus in spatial terms.[^1] The habitus is the cultural, social, and spatial environment in which an individual lives, shaped by overarching structural elements such as the dominant political or economic system, and in turn shaping the individual’s worldview.[^1] This environment is not merely external; it is internalised as bodily postures, motor schemes, and automatisms through which the body and language function as repositories of “deferred thoughts” that can be triggered by being placed once again in a familiar overall posture or situation.¹ Habitus thus exists at once “out there” in social space and “in here” in our embodied dispositions; it is the way society becomes deposited in persons.¹⁴¹⁴

The durability of habitus stems from its genesis in “innumerable past practices” observed since birth, especially within the family, and consolidated via other institutions such as education and employment.¹²¹ These repeated practices gradually form a “present past that tends to perpetuate itself into the future,” giving individuals a “feel for the game” in various fields of action.¹²¹²¹⁵ At the same time, habitus is not a rigid determinism; it is a system of predispositions that allows for improvisation and innovation in response to specific events.¹² As one reference text emphasises, in the confrontation between habitus and an event, “new solutions are improvised,” making habitus an “art of inventing” that is both habitual and improvisatory, rote and novel.²

Habitus as a “Home”: Spatial Metaphors and Identity Formation

The spatial dimension of habitus is not merely metaphorical, as the reference materials highlight.[^1]³² In one example discussed, Bourdieu likens habitus to a home in which the experience of space shapes an individual’s outlook on their place in the world.[^1] This analogy emphasises how the spatial environment, including the organisation of urban spaces or domestic interiors, participates in forming identity by repeatedly triggering bodily habits and cultural memories.[^1]² Gaston Bachelard’s Poetics of Space is invoked as a parallel exploration of how intimate spaces contribute to the formation of selfhood.[^1]

Michel de Certeau, in his critical engagement with Bourdieu, goes further and suggests that dwelling functions as a “silent and determining memory” hidden beneath the theoretical metaphor of habitus, providing it with an appearance of reality.³ According to de Certeau, dwelling gives the habitus its form, but not its content; in other words, the spatial and domestic experiences that underpin habitus lend it a certain referentiality, even if theory only captures them as an abstract system of dispositions.³ This is a crucial remark for our purposes: it indicates that Bourdieu’s concept of habitus may covertly presuppose something like Heidegger’s dwelling, a lived intimacy with place that shapes and is shaped by memory and practice.

The references also emphasise that everyday life can be understood as “the nexus of spaces and times that repeatedly trigger bodily habits and cultural memories—the habitus.”² Time and repetition are critical: it is through the routines of everyday life, organised temporally and spatially, that bodies learn the habitus.² This resonates strongly with Heidegger’s emphasis on temporality and spatiality as equiprimordial in Dasein’s existence, and suggests a potential bridge whereby habitus could be interpreted as a historically specific configuration of dwelling practices.

Habitus plays a central role in Bourdieu’s account of how social structures—especially class structures—are reproduced across generations.¹⁶¹⁴¹⁴ Because habitus is shaped by one’s structural position and, in turn, generates perceptions and actions, individuals’ practices tend to be objectively adjusted to their social conditions without requiring conscious coordination.¹⁶¹³¹⁴ A person’s tastes in food, art, sport, or clothing, their sense of what is reasonable or respectable conduct, and their expectations about the future all bear the imprint of their class‑specific habitus.¹²¹⁵¹⁴¹³

Reference materials stress that habitus is a “subjective but not individual” system of internalised structures and schemes of perception, conception, and action common to members of the same group or class.¹¹³ The shared nature of these dispositions means that members of a group experience a kind of taken‑for‑granted consensus about the meaning of practices and sayings, making social life both intelligible and foreseeable.¹² This is why Bourdieu’s concept is so powerful for explaining social reproduction: it shows how domination can persist without conscious coercion, as individuals unconsciously reproduce the very social conditions that shaped them, simply by acting in ways that feel natural and self‑evident.¹⁶¹⁴¹⁴

At the same time, habitus allows for individual variation and change, particularly when the structural conditions that gave rise to a given habitus are transformed.¹²¹²¹⁴ Unexpected situations or long historical periods can destabilise existing dispositions, leading to a “crisis of practices.”¹⁷ Yet such change is generally gradual, because habitus arises from innumerable past practices rather than from explicit rules that can be easily revised.¹²¹⁷¹⁴¹⁴ Here, too, the contrast with Heidegger is instructive: whereas Heidegger thematises the possibility of an abrupt existential transformation (through anxiety, the call of conscience, or poetic shock), Bourdieu focuses on how social transformation is mediated by deeply sedimented dispositions that tend to resist sudden upheavals.

Habitus as Practical Sense and Bodily Memory

The reference texts also underline the bodily and pre‑reflective character of habitus.¹² Bourdieu describes practical sense as a “quasi‑bodily involvement” converted into motor schemes and body automatisms.¹ The body and language function as repositories of deferred thoughts that can be triggered simply by replacing the body in an overall posture that recalls associated thoughts and feelings.¹ Everyday life, through its time‑space organisation, teaches bodies the habitus, so that acting “normally” becomes an embodied, pre‑theoretical know‑how.¹²

Michel de Certeau’s critique of Bourdieu notes that in order to guarantee the stability of such a basis for explanation, habitus is posited as invisible and unverifiable; it functions as a “dogmatic place” affirming a reality that theory needs in order to be totalising.⁴ This underscores the quasi‑ontological role habitus comes to play in Bourdieu’s sociology: it is the unseen ground of practices, analogous in some respects to Heidegger’s existential structures of being-in-the-world. Yet, unlike Heidegger, Bourdieu aims not to describe the ontological conditions of any human existence, but to account for the genesis of particular practices within specific socio‑historical contexts.⁴

Habitus has thus been fruitfully interpreted, in phenomenological and critical literature, as a sociologised transformation of insights from Husserl and Merleau‑Ponty about embodiment, intentionality, and the pre‑predicative level of experience.¹⁸¹⁹ The idea that our bodily postures and skills embody a “cognitive memory” of basic values and categories resonates with phenomenological accounts of the lived body as the site of inherited meanings and norms.¹²⁰²¹ This provides an opening for a dialogue with Heidegger’s dwelling, which also privileges embodied, pre‑conceptual familiarity with a world.

With these two conceptual constellations in view, we can now explore systematically how Heidegger’s dwelling and Bourdieu’s habitus relate, converge, and diverge.

Lived Space and the Priority of Situatedness

Both Heidegger and Bourdieu reject the notion of space as a neutral container in which pre‑constituted subjects reside. For Heidegger, Dasein’s spatiality is inseparable from its being‑in‑the‑world: we are “in” the world by being involved with entities, concerned with tasks, and oriented toward possibilities.⁷⁶⁸ Spatiality belongs to Dasein through this Being‑in; it is not a property of an interior subject juxtaposed to an exterior space, but arises from the way Dasein “makes room” for itself and others in a meaningful situation.⁷⁸ This existential spatiality is what underlies dwelling: to dwell is to stay with things and others in such a way that the fourfold is preserved and allowed to appear.³⁹⁵

Bourdieu, likewise, insists that individuals are situated in social space, which is structured by relations of power, capital, and field, and that their dispositions are shaped by this spatialized structure.[^1]¹⁴¹⁴ The reference materials explicitly describe habitus as the cultural, social, and spatial environment in which an individual lives, emphasising that this environment both reflects and reproduces overarching structural elements.[^1] Everyday life is framed as a nexus of spaces and times that repeatedly trigger bodily habits and cultural memories.² Thus, habitus is not an abstract mental schema but a spatialised, embodied way of inhabiting a social world.

Phenomenological discussions of Heidegger’s notion of Dasein’s “situation” as equiprimordially temporal and spatial align closely with Bourdieu’s emphasis on the spatial organisation of practices.⁷⁸ Both accounts insist that to understand human existence, we must begin not from a detached observer but from a situated, embodied agent whose worldview is shaped by the spaces they dwell in or habitually traverse. In this sense, habitus can be seen as a sociological continuation of the phenomenological insight that we are always already somewhere—in a home, a city, a landscape, a network of social relations—and that this situatedness is constitutive of how we experience ourselves and others.[^1]²⁷⁸

Home, Dwelling, and Habitus

The spatial metaphor of the home is a particularly fertile point of contact.[^1]³⁵⁵ Bourdieu likens the habitus to a home in which the experience of space shapes the individual’s outlook on their place in the world.[^1] This metaphor suggests that habitus is an interiorised dwelling place, a “second nature” house made of practices, tastes, and norms where one feels more or less at ease.[^1]¹⁵¹⁴ The domestic space, with its arrangement of rooms, furniture, and routines, becomes a school of dispositions: learning how to move, speak, and behave at home is learning the habitus.[^1]²¹⁵

Heidegger’s notion of dwelling, as articulated in “Building Dwelling Thinking,” also centres on the house but in a different way. Buildings “house man,” but “he inhabits them and yet does not dwell in them, when to dwell means merely that we take shelter in them.”³⁹ To genuinely dwell is not merely to reside; it is to spare and preserve the fourfold in the way one lives among things.³⁹ The home is not primarily a physical shelter but a place where a world is disclosed and cared for. In this sense, the house in Heidegger is a site where a particular way of attuning to earth, sky, divinities, and mortals is practised and sustained.³⁹⁵⁵

De Certeau’s remark that dwelling is a “silent and determining memory” hidden beneath the metaphor of habitus, and that dwelling gives the habitus its form, can be read as a mediating insight.³ He suggests that the spatial and domestic experiences that underlie our dispositions lend habitus its reality; the theory of habitus, in abstracting from these lived experiences, risks turning them into merely plausible constructs.³ In other words, habitus is, in part, an attempt to theorise what Heidegger calls dwelling: the way in which long‑term inhabitation of certain spaces—especially the home and the city—inscribes itself as memory and style in our bodies and practices.[^1]³²

From this perspective, Bourdieu’s habitus might be understood as the socially differentiated content of dwelling. While Heidegger speaks of dwelling in ontological terms, as the basic character of human existence, Bourdieu shows how different classes, genders, and groups dwell differently, internalising distinct “homes” of norms and tastes that structure their possibilities and sense of belonging.[^1]¹²¹⁴¹ The bourgeois dwelling in a Parisian apartment, for instance, with its particular layout, decor, and rituals, fosters a habitus that differs markedly from that of inhabitants of a rural peasant house or a working‑class housing estate.[^1] Heidegger’s formal analysis of dwelling thus requires supplementation by a sociology of concrete dwellings; conversely, Bourdieu’s analysis of habitus can gain ontological depth by being re‑read through the lens of dwelling.

World, Field, and Local Place

Heidegger’s world and Bourdieu’s field also bear a family resemblance. For Heidegger, world is the holistic structure of significance “wherein” Dasein lives; it is localised and plural, taking different shapes in different communities and eras.⁶⁵⁵ In his later work, he stresses the multiplicity of “forms of life” and understandings of being, and calls humans “dwellers” defined by their particular relations to the entities that emerge in the local places they help disclose.⁵⁵

Bourdieu’s concept of field refers to structured social spaces—intellectual, religious, educational, cultural—where actors, endowed with various forms of capital, struggle over stakes and positions.²²²³¹⁴¹⁴ The habitus is what allows agents to navigate these fields with a “feel for the game,” spontaneously aligning their moves with the field’s logic.²²¹⁵¹⁴¹⁴ Each field can be seen as a kind of world with its own regularities and modes of valuation.

If we bring these together, we might say that dwelling names the existential way in which Dasein inhabits a world, while habitus names the historically specific dispositions that make certain fields feel like “home” and others alien or inaccessible. Dwelling is the ontological structure that makes any field possible as a lived space; habitus is the field‑specific style of dwelling that embodies the social history of a class or group. Heidegger’s later description of poetic dwellers as those who “take the measure” of their situations in light of what really matters can thus be contrasted with Bourdieu’s account of how habitus tacitly measures situations according to the values and possibilities inscribed by social structures.⁵⁵ Where Heidegger seeks to retrieve a more originary, non‑instrumental measure, Bourdieu analyses the socially shaped metric embedded in everyday judgment and action.

Embodiment, Memory, and Everyday Practice

The Body as Site of Dwelling and Habitus

Both Heidegger and Bourdieu attribute a central role to the body as the site where world and self coalesce. Bourdieu’s habitus is emphatically embodied: practical sense is a quasi‑bodily involvement converted into motor schemes and automatisms; the body and language store “deferred thoughts” that can be reactivated by specific postures or spatial arrangements.¹ Habitus can be viewed as an embodied memory of social structures, inscribed in gestures, postures, gait, accent, and style.¹²⁰¹⁵²¹¹³

Heidegger’s early work, though often criticised for under‑theorising the body, nonetheless treats Dasein as “spatial” in virtue of its bodily involvement with equipment and others.⁷⁶⁸ Later phenomenologists such as Merleau‑Ponty elaborated this dimension, showing how the lived body is a psychosomatic unity that expresses and interprets the world through its movements and sensations.²¹²⁴ In this phenomenological lineage, dwelling can be understood as a bodily way of “being at home” in a world: familiarity with tools, places, and practices is sedimented in bodily know‑how. This is explicitly noted in some Heideggerian interpretations of space, which argue that Dasein’s spatiality is a matter of situated involvement, not mere location, and that to dwell is to inhabit a network of embodied relations to things, regions, and others.⁷⁸

Bourdieu’s notion of hexis—a person’s carriage and speech, the bodily manifestations of habitus—directly resonates with this phenomenological account.¹³ Reference materials on habitus stress that postural habitus can be viewed as the body’s physical manifestation of the habits acquired through life, shaping how we hold ourselves and move through spaces.¹⁵¹³ Thus, both dwelling and habitus can be said to operate “through the body” as a medium of memory and orientation. Heidegger’s emphasis on staying with things and letting them presence, and Bourdieu’s emphasis on bodily automatisms that recall associated thoughts and feelings, both point toward a non‑cognitive, embodied layer of existence where world and self are intertwined.³¹²⁷

Memory, Repetition, and the Everyday

Repetition and routine play crucial roles in both frameworks, though with different emphases. For Bourdieu, habitus is formed through the repeated practices and experiences of everyday life, particularly in early childhood.¹²¹²¹⁵¹ The routines of the family home, school, workplace, and public spaces organise time and space in ways that repeatedly trigger and reinforce certain bodily habits and cultural memories.[^1]² Everyday life is thus defined as the nexus of spaces and times that teach our bodies the habitus, shaping selfhood and personhood through material and bodily practices.²

Heidegger, especially in Being and Time, also analyses the everyday as the context in which Dasein’s being‑in‑the‑world is for the most part lived out. In everydayness, Dasein is absorbed in its concerns, dealing with equipment and others in ways that usually go unnoticed, guided by the anonymous norms of das Man.⁶¹⁰ This everyday absorption is both the site of our most authentic familiarity with the world and the site of our greatest danger: the danger of falling into inauthenticity, merely doing what “one” does without owning our possibilities.⁶¹⁰ Later, when he speaks of dwelling, Heidegger seeks to retrieve a more original relation to the everyday, one that is not dominated by technological enframing or anonymous norms but by a poetic openness to Being.³⁵⁵

Michel de Certeau’s interpretation of everyday life as the field where habitus is both shaped and tactically subverted adds another layer.²⁴ He defines everyday life as the repetition and routine that teach bodies the habitus, but also emphasises that within this repetition there is an “art of inventing” new practices.² Here, Bourdieu’s account of habitus as both structured and structuring, both repetitive and generative, intersects with Heidegger’s notion that everyday life can be either oppressive or liberating, depending on how it is organised and inhabited.²⁶ Dwelling, in this shared horizon, would be the mode of inhabiting everyday spaces and times in a way that either reinforces or transforms existing structures of meaning and power.

Familiarity, Home, and Uncanniness

Both dwelling and habitus involve a dimension of familiarity—a sense of being at home in a world that “goes without saying.” For Bourdieu, the fact that members of the same group share a habitus means they experience a taken‑for‑granted consensus about what is meaningful, reasonable, or tasteful.¹²¹⁴¹¹³ Practices and sayings are immediately intelligible and foreseeable, and so taken as natural.¹²¹⁴¹³ This familiarity is a key mechanism of social reproduction: because norms are embodied and unquestioned, they perpetuate existing structures of inequality without appearing as external constraints.¹⁶¹⁴¹⁴

Heidegger’s notion of dwelling also entails familiarity: to dwell is to be at home in a world, to understand it practically, and to possess the skills to navigate it.⁶⁵⁵ However, he insists that human existence is also characterised by unheimlich—uncanniness, not‑being‑at‑home—which is revealed in experiences such as anxiety, where the familiar world collapses and Dasein is confronted with its own finitude and freedom.²⁶¹¹⁵ Later, he suggests that authentic dwelling might require a certain acceptance of this uncanniness, an openness to other possible ways of being that disrupt the closure of any given form of life.⁵⁵

The relation between habitus and uncanniness is complex. On the one hand, habitus is designed to explain how we usually feel at home, how our bodies and minds readily fit into the social spaces we inhabit.[^1]¹²¹²¹ On the other hand, sudden changes in social conditions or encounters with unfamiliar fields can produce a sense of disorientation—a mismatch between habitus and field—which can be experienced as uncanny or out‑of‑place.¹⁷¹⁵¹⁴¹⁴ From a Heideggerian perspective, such crises could be seen as opportunities for a more authentic dwelling, moments when the taken‑for‑granted nature of our socialised “home” is exposed and can be questioned. From a Bourdieusian perspective, they are moments of hysteresis, where the lag of habitus with respect to changing structures reveals the inertia of embodied dispositions.¹⁷¹⁴¹⁴

In sum, both dwelling and habitus grapple with the tension between familiarity and estrangement, home and homelessness, routine and transformation. This provides a powerful lens for analysing how people experience their social and spatial environments, and how they respond to shifts in those environments.

Heidegger’s concept of das Man (“the They”) describes how, in everyday life, our being-in-the-world is governed by impersonal norms and expectations.⁶¹⁰ We do what one does, think what one thinks, and value what one values; our choices, speech, and attitudes are shaped by a diffuse social anonymity.⁶¹⁰ This socialised self—the they‑self—is not an external imposition but a mode of our own existence; it is how we primarily are, and yet it covers over our singular possibilities.⁶¹⁰

Bourdieu’s habitus likewise describes how social norms and structures become internalised such that they guide perception and action without explicit awareness.¹¹²¹⁴¹¹³¹⁴ Habitus instils a worldview by conferring cultural value upon things and practices; it furnishes “things to do or not to do, to say or not to say,” determining what counts as reasonable or unreasonable conduct.¹²¹⁴¹¹³¹⁴ Like das Man, habitus is both subjective and supraindividual; it is shared by members of a group, and yet it feels like one’s own way of being.

One might say that das Man is an ontological‑existential description of social normativity, while habitus is a sociological operationalisation of how such normativity is produced, differentiated, and reproduced in specific fields and classes. Heidegger does not provide a detailed account of how norms differ across social groups or how power shapes their content; Bourdieu’s work is precisely devoted to such questions.¹⁶²²²³¹⁴¹⁴ Conversely, Bourdieu does not typically engage the more radical question that drives Heidegger: how might we respond to the call of conscience that summons us beyond anonymous norms toward a more authentic appropriation of our possibilities?¹⁰¹⁹⁵

Power, Domination, and Misrecognition

Power is central to Bourdieu’s theory and largely absent from Heidegger’s conceptual vocabulary. Habitus is deeply implicated in the reproduction of social domination, since it is through norms and tastes that distinctions of class, gender, and race are both marked and naturalised.¹⁶²²²³¹⁴¹⁴ Cultural capital, linguistic styles, aesthetic preferences, and bodily comportments all serve as markers of social position, and habitus tends to align practices with one’s objective place in social space.²²²³¹⁵¹⁴¹³¹⁴

Reference materials note that Bourdieu sees power as culturally and symbolically created, constantly re‑legitimised through the interplay of habitus, capital, and field.¹⁴¹⁴ Habitus is “the way society becomes deposited in persons,” leading to enduring propensities to think, feel, and act in determinant ways that reproduce existing structures.¹⁴¹⁴ This reproduction is often misrecognised: individuals perceive their dispositions and tastes as natural or personal, rather than as historically formed and socially conditioned.¹⁶¹⁴¹⁴

Heidegger’s language of dwelling and the fourfold might seem at first sight to be far removed from such issues. Yet his critique of the technological age, where everything—including earth, sky, mortals, and divinities—is turned into a stockpile of resources, has clear implications for power and domination.⁵⁵ To dwell poorly, to be “homeless,” is to be maladapted to the particularities of one’s place, no longer participating in disclosing and conserving it.⁵⁵ In a world organised by technological enframing, even our sense of home is colonised by instrumental rationality, and our dwelling is reduced to mere housing.³[^1]⁹⁵⁵ While Heidegger does not translate this into an analysis of class or institutional power, his diagnosis of homelessness resonates with sociological critiques of how capitalist urbanisation and bureaucratic systems disrupt traditional forms of dwelling.

Bringing Bourdieu into this picture allows us to specify how precisely technological and economic structures penetrate the micro‑structures of everyday life. Habitus names the way in which, say, a neoliberal market logic is embodied in our consumption practices, work habits, and aspirations, shaping what feels normal or desirable.²²²³¹⁵¹⁴¹⁴ Heidegger’s notion of poetic dwelling could then be interpreted as a call to resist such colonisation by cultivating practices that preserve alternative ways of being-with others and things, ways not reducible to market or bureaucratic logics. Bourdieu’s theory, in turn, reminds us that such resistance cannot be purely individual or purely ontological; it must engage the concrete fields and capitals that enable or constrain different modes of dwelling.

Authenticity, Reflexivity, and Critical Distance

Heidegger’s distinction between authentic and inauthentic modes of existence hinges on whether Dasein owns its possibilities or merely follows the anonymous dictates of das Man.⁶¹⁰ Authenticity is not a withdrawal from the world but a modified way of being‑in‑the‑world, where norms and routines are critically appropriated rather than blindly adopted.⁶¹⁰⁵⁵ The call of conscience summons Dasein out of its lostness in the “they” toward an awareness of its finitude and responsibility.¹⁰⁵⁵ In later work, this authenticity is refigured as poetic dwelling, where one takes the measure of life in light of what truly matters, rather than in terms of socially given metrics of success.⁵⁵

Bourdieu does not deploy the language of authenticity, but his methodological project of reflexive sociology has a similar critical thrust. He urges sociologists to become aware of their own habitus, to “see society in themselves and themselves in society,” thereby avoiding the illusion of being outside social conditioning.²⁵ While habitus operates largely unconsciously, Bourdieu does not deny the possibility of reflexive awareness; indeed, he interprets scientific practice as a kind of regulated improvisation that demands a critical distance from primary socialisation.¹⁸¹⁹²⁵

From a Heideggerian standpoint, one might ask whether Bourdieu’s concept of habitus allows for a genuinely existential transformation of one’s way of dwelling, or whether reflexivity remains confined to adjustments within the same field and habitus. From a Bourdieusian standpoint, one might question whether Heidegger’s call to authenticity adequately accounts for how structural constraints and unequal distributions of capital limit individuals’ capacity to transform their mode of dwelling. This raises difficult questions about the intersection of ontological and sociological analysis: can there be an authentic dwelling under conditions of structural domination? Or must the very possibility of poetic dwelling be linked to social struggle and institutional change?

Creativity, Change, and the Question of Second Nature

Habitus as “Art of Inventing” and the Flexibility of Dwelling

Despite its emphasis on reproduction, Bourdieu’s concept of habitus is not static. Reference materials highlight that habitus is a flexible disposition that allows one to act in ways that are at once habitual and improvisatory.¹²¹²¹⁷¹⁴¹⁴ It is “above all an art of inventing,” capable of generating new solutions in the confrontation between habitus and event.² Habitus both constrains and enables creativity; it defines a field of “objective potentialities,” things to do or not to do in relation to situations that people confront.¹²

Heidegger’s notion of dwelling also contains a creative dimension, particularly in his emphasis on poetic dwelling as a way of bringing into being new worlds of meaning.⁵⁵ Poetic dwellers “build” not only in the sense of erecting edifices and cultivating growing things, but also in the sense of letting new constellations of the fourfold emerge and be conserved.³⁹⁵⁵ Poetry, understood broadly as world‑disclosing language and practice, is a “measure‑taking” that evaluates and reshapes life according to what truly matters.⁵⁵ Dwelling is thus not mere maintenance of a given home but an ongoing creative engagement with place, time, and community.

The concept of second nature is useful here. Habitus is often described as a second nature, a set of acquired dispositions that feel natural and spontaneous.¹⁷¹⁵¹⁴¹³¹⁴ Dwelling, too, can be thought of as second nature: our way of feeling at home in the world is learned, historically formed, yet experienced as immediate. However, both Heidegger and Bourdieu insist, in their own ways, that second nature is not immutable. For Bourdieu, unexpected situations, new fields, and social transformations can modify habitus over time.¹²¹²¹⁷¹⁵¹⁴¹⁴ For Heidegger, experiences such as anxiety, the call of conscience, or poetic encounters can disclose the contingency of our familiar world and open us to other possibilities of dwelling.⁶¹¹⁵⁵

By bringing these together, we can think of habitus as the historically sedimented style of dwelling that characterises a given group—a style that can be creatively reworked in response to crises, new encounters, or reflective praxis. Dwelling, in turn, becomes the ontological horizon within which such reworking takes place: any transformation of habitus is a transformation of how one dwells, how one “takes place” in the fourfold.

Crisis, Hysteresis, and Unhomeliness

Bourdieu’s notion of hysteresis describes the lag between habitus and changing objective structures.¹⁷¹⁴¹⁴ When the social fields within which a habitus was formed undergo rapid transformation, existing dispositions may no longer be well adapted, leading to disorientation, maladjustment, or a sense of not belonging.¹⁷¹⁵¹⁴¹⁴ This can be seen, for example, in situations of migration, deindustrialisation, or sudden shifts in educational systems, where inherited dispositions clash with new requirements and norms.[^1]¹⁶²²¹⁵

Heidegger’s concept of unhomeliness (Unheimlichkeit) and homelessness provides a parallel in existential terms.²⁶¹¹⁵⁵ Dasein is originally not at home in the world; its everyday familiarity is a kind of cover over this underlying uncanniness, which can be revealed in anxiety.⁶¹¹⁵ In the technological age, Heidegger argues, we are particularly homeless: our relations to earth, sky, divinities, and mortals are distorted by an enframing that turns everything into resources, so that genuine dwelling is endangered.⁵⁵

The hysteresis of habitus can thus be interpreted as a sociological manifestation of unhomeliness: the world in which one’s habitus was at home has changed, and the second nature that once facilitated smooth navigation now hinders it. Conversely, Heidegger’s homelessness can be specified sociologically as the experience of being displaced by particular economic, political, or cultural transformations. Dwelling, in this shared horizon, is always precarious and contested, never simply given.

This opens a space for questioning how new forms of dwelling can emerge. Bourdieu’s theory suggests that new habitus formations may arise through prolonged exposure to new fields, through educational experiences that deliberately challenge primary socialisation, or through collective movements that create alternative institutions and practices.¹⁶²²²³¹⁵¹⁴¹⁴ Heidegger’s thought suggests that poetic practices—art, poetry, thinking—can disclose new ways of being and inspire transformations in how we inhabit places.⁵⁵ A critical synthesis would ask how poetic world‑disclosure and sociological practice can work together to foster more just and meaningful modes of dwelling.

Embodied Knowledge of Place and Reflexive Habitus

Recent empirical and theoretical work on embodied knowledge of place draws implicitly on both Heidegger and Bourdieu.²⁶²⁷²⁸ Such research investigates how individuals’ bodily engagements with landscapes, neighbourhoods, and built environments encode affective and cognitive understandings of place that are not easily articulated in discursive terms.⁷²⁶²⁷²⁸ Methods for accessing this embodied knowledge—walk‑along interviews, participatory mapping, sensory ethnography—are designed to tap into the felt sense of dwelling that guides everyday movement and attachment.²⁶²⁷²⁸²⁹

These approaches resonate with Heidegger’s insistence that Dasein’s familiarity with the world is primarily practical, affective, and embodied, and with Bourdieu’s claim that habitus resides in bodily automatisms, postures, and skills.¹²⁷⁸¹⁵²¹¹³ At the same time, they often aim at fostering reflexivity in participants, encouraging them to reflect on how their feelings of comfort or discomfort, safety or fear, belonging or exclusion, are shaped by structural conditions such as class, race, gender, disability, and urban design.⁷²⁶²⁸³⁰

In this light, habitus can be reconceived not only as a mechanism of reproduction but also as a potential resource for critical awareness, once individuals are invited to attend to their embodied dwelling in place. Heidegger’s notion of dwelling can provide a normative horizon for such reflection, highlighting the importance of caring for the fourfold and resisting forms of spatial organisation that destroy the possibility of meaningful dwelling.⁹⁵⁵ Bourdieu’s analysis of habitus, capital, and field can help clarify why some groups have greater access than others to spaces where they can dwell poetically, and why certain forms of dwelling are devalued or rendered invisible.¹⁶²²²³¹⁵¹⁴¹⁴

Points of Convergence

Bringing Heidegger’s dwelling and Bourdieu’s habitus into dialogue reveals a number of convergences. Both concepts aim to move beyond dualisms of subject and object, mind and world, structure and agency, by focusing on the embodied, practical ways in which humans inhabit meaningful worlds.[^1]¹²⁷⁶⁸¹⁵²¹¹³ Both emphasise spatiality and place: dwelling is the manner in which mortals are on the earth, and habitus is the spatialised environment internalised as dispositions.[^1]³⁹⁵⁵ Both highlight the importance of everyday practices, routines, and repetition in forming our ways of being, and both grant a central role to the body as the site where world and self intertwine.¹²⁷⁸¹⁵²¹¹³

Moreover, both concepts have a double valence: they describe how we are typically at home in the world, but also how this very homeliness can obscure alternative possibilities and sustain problematic structures. Heidegger’s das Man and Bourdieu’s habitus both capture the taken‑for‑granted nature of social norms, the way they guide behaviour without explicit awareness.⁶¹⁶¹⁰¹⁴¹¹³¹⁴ Both thinkers also acknowledge the possibility, albeit in different terms, of transformation: Heidegger through authenticity and poetic dwelling, Bourdieu through the flexibility of habitus and the potential for reflexive critique.¹²¹²¹⁸¹⁷⁵¹⁹⁵

Finally, both concepts are rooted, explicitly or implicitly, in phenomenology. Bourdieu drew on Husserl, Merleau‑Ponty, and others to conceptualise habitus as an embodied, pre‑reflective system of dispositions.¹⁸¹⁷¹⁵²¹¹⁹ Heidegger was a key figure in phenomenology’s development, and his analysis of being-in-the-world inspired many later accounts of embodied subjectivity.⁷⁶⁸²¹ De Certeau’s observation that dwelling is hidden in the metaphor of habitus can thus be taken literally: habitus is a sociological descendant of phenomenological analyses of dwelling.³²⁷²¹

Points of Divergence

Despite these affinities, important differences remain. Heidegger’s project is fundamentally ontological and existential: he seeks to clarify the meaning of Being and the basic structures of human existence, including dwelling, in a way that holds for any historical epoch, even if its expressions vary.⁶⁵⁵ Bourdieu’s project is sociological and critical: he aims to explain the genesis of specific practices, the reproduction of social hierarchies, and the dynamics of power in concrete fields.¹⁶²²²³¹⁵¹⁴¹⁴ As a result, dwelling tends to operate at a more formal level, while habitus is tied closely to empirical studies of particular societies.

Normativity is also handled differently. Heidegger’s late work clearly valorises poetic dwelling as a superior form of existence, criticising technological enframing and homelessness.⁵⁵ Bourdieu, by contrast, tends to adopt a more descriptive and critical stance, analysing how habitus contributes to domination without explicitly articulating a positive ideal of good dwelling or just social arrangements.¹⁶²²²³¹⁵¹⁴¹⁴ His rare normative remarks emphasise the importance of reflexivity and the possibility of scientific and political interventions to transform social structures.¹⁸¹⁹²⁵

Furthermore, while Heidegger acknowledges social normativity through das Man, he does not provide a detailed analysis of how class, race, gender, and other axes of inequality differentiate modes of dwelling.⁶¹¹⁵⁵ Bourdieu’s concept of habitus is precisely designed to capture such differentiation, showing how different classes embody distinct tastes, expectations, and dispositions that reinforce their positions.¹⁶²²²³¹⁵¹⁴¹⁴ From a Bourdieusian standpoint, Heidegger’s dwelling risks being too abstract, overlooking how access to spaces of poetic dwelling is unequally distributed.

Conversely, from a Heideggerian or phenomenological standpoint, Bourdieu’s habitus can be criticised for remaining too tied to objective structures, treating embodied subjectivity primarily as an effect of social forces rather than as a site of originary world‑disclosure.¹⁸¹⁹ De Certeau suggests that by turning dwelling into a theoretical metaphor, Bourdieu loses the singularity of originary experience, which he had in his own upbringing and in his Kabylian fieldwork.³³¹ Heidegger’s focus on existential structures and the possibility of authenticity highlights dimensions of freedom, finitude, and meaning that are not fully accounted for by habitus.

Toward a Critical Integration

A fruitful way to relate the two concepts is to think of habitus as a social style of dwelling and of dwelling as the ontological horizon of habitus. Habitus describes how specific groups dwell: how they move, speak, work, celebrate, and mourn; how they relate to earth (land, property, environment), sky (climate, temporality), divinities (norms, values, sacred), and mortals (others, ancestors, descendants).[^1]¹²¹⁶²²²³¹⁵¹⁴¹¹⁴ Different habitus embody different configurations of the fourfold and different ways of caring—or failing to care—for it. The bourgeois habitus of urban elites, for example, may involve a certain detachment from earth and sky, living in air‑conditioned interiors and treating natural environments as leisure backdrops, whereas a rural peasant habitus might embody a more direct, seasonal attunement to land and weather.[^1]¹⁶²²²³¹⁵¹⁴¹⁴

Dwelling, in turn, names the broader existential structure within which such social styles operate. It reminds us that being at home in a world is not just a matter of social position but also of finitude, mortality, and openness to Being. It insists that our relations to earth, sky, divinities, and mortals cannot be reduced to social functions or power relations, even though they are always entangled with them.⁹⁵⁵ It also opens a normative perspective from which to criticise forms of habitus that degrade or instrumentalise the fourfold, such as consumerist or technocratic dispositions that treat earth and sky as mere resources, divinities as commodified symbols, and mortals as human capital.⁵⁵

Conversely, Bourdieu’s conceptual apparatus—habitus, capital, field—can serve to “sociologise” Heidegger’s dwelling, specifying how economic, cultural, and symbolic capitals are distributed, how fields structure opportunities for dwelling, and how particular habitus embody or distort the ethical heritage that Heidegger associates with divinities.¹⁶²²²³¹⁵¹⁴¹⁴⁵ It can show, for instance, how the capacity to dwell poetically in a well‑designed home, to enjoy natural landscapes, or to participate in cultural rites is unequally accessible, and how strategies of distinction turn certain dwellings into markers of status.

This integration suggests a two‑level critique. At the ontological level, Heidegger’s dwelling critiques the technological enframing and homelessness of modern societies, calling for a renewed care for the fourfold.⁹⁵⁵ At the sociological level, Bourdieu’s habitus critiques the ways in which social structures shape and often constrain people’s modes of dwelling, reproducing inequalities and misrecognitions.¹⁶²²²³¹⁵¹⁴¹⁴ Together, they invite us to ask: what would it mean, concretely, to create social conditions in which all could dwell poetically, in ways that are both authentic and just? How can we transform habitus and fields so that they foster, rather than inhibit, such dwelling?

Conclusion

Heidegger’s concept of dwelling and Bourdieu’s concept of habitus emerge from different intellectual projects—one ontological‑phenomenological, the other sociological‑critical—but they converge in their focus on embodied, spatially situated, and pre‑reflective ways of being in the world. Dwelling names the basic character of human existence as being‑in‑the‑world, understood as a sparing and preserving engagement with the fourfold of earth, sky, divinities, and mortals, mediated by building and poetic measure‑taking.³⁶⁹⁵⁵ Habitus names the durable, transposable dispositions that result from one’s position in social space and that generate practices, perceptions, and tastes, thus mediating between structures and actions.[^1]¹²¹²¹⁶²²²³¹⁵¹⁴¹¹³¹⁴

The relation between the two can be summarised in three key claims. First, habitus can be interpreted as the socially and historically specific content of dwelling. Where Heidegger speaks of dwelling in formal, ontological terms, Bourdieu shows how concrete dwellings—homes, schools, workplaces, cities—shape distinct styles of being-at-home, embodied as habitus.[^1]¹²¹⁶²²²³¹⁵¹⁴¹¹⁴ De Certeau’s observation that dwelling is a “silent and determining memory” hidden in the metaphor of habitus confirms that Bourdieu’s theory presupposes, even if it does not thematise, a phenomenology of dwelling.³²

Second, dwelling provides the ontological horizon within which habitus operates. Habitus explains how social structures sediment into second natures, but it does not ask what it means, more fundamentally, for humans to be beings for whom such second natures are possible.⁶¹⁸²¹¹⁹ Heidegger’s analysis of being-in-the-world, being-with, and dwelling clarifies that humans are not simply products of social structures but beings whose essence lies in inhabiting meaningful worlds, caring for things and others, and being finite.⁷⁶¹¹⁵⁵ This does not relativise or diminish the importance of habitus; rather, it situates it within a broader account of human existence.

Third, the dialogue between dwelling and habitus opens a space for a richer critique and transformation of our ways of being. Heidegger’s call for poetic dwelling invites us to question the technological and instrumental organisation of space and time, highlighting the risk of homelessness even amid material comfort.³⁹⁵⁵ Bourdieu’s analysis of habitus reveals how such organisation is deeply entwined with power, capital, and social reproduction, shaping who can dwell where and how.¹⁶²²²³¹⁵¹⁴¹¹³¹⁴ A critical integration suggests that transforming our modes of dwelling requires both existential reflection (on what truly matters, how we relate to earth, sky, divinities, mortals) and sociological action (restructuring fields, redistributing capital, cultivating new habitus through education and practice).

In practical terms, this means that questions of architecture, urban design, education, and policy cannot be reduced either to technical optimisation or to symbolic representation; they concern the very conditions of dwelling and the formation of habitus. How we build, which spaces we preserve or destroy, what routines we institutionalise in schools and workplaces, how we distribute access to green spaces and cultural institutions—all these shape both the ontological and sociological dimensions of human existence.[^1]³²³²²⁶²⁷²²²³³³²⁸³⁰ To think together Heidegger’s dwelling and Bourdieu’s habitus is to take seriously the idea that the built and social environments are not mere backdrops but active participants in the formation of selves and communities, and that any project of human flourishing must attend to the ways in which we dwell and the habitus through which we do so. [^1] www.planksip.org

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