WikiDebatesTheories of the Everyday: Affirm, Transform, or Resist

Theories of the Everyday: Affirm, Transform, or Resist

Theories of the Everyday: Affirm, Transform, or Resist

Framing

This debate stages the disagreement within the theory of everyday life over what the everyday is and what should be done with it. The canonical positions — Michel de Certeau, Henri Lefebvre, Rita Felski, and Agnes Heller — all agree that the mundane, quotidian sphere matters and is routinely devalued, but they part ways sharply over its character and its politics. At stake is the basic question: is the everyday a neutral, common ground to be affirmed (its repetition, home, and habit valued rather than scorned); a mystified sphere of alienation to be diagnosed and transformed (its "colonization" by consumption unveiled, its festival potential recovered); a sphere of particularity whose structure is not itself the cause of alienation, and which can therefore be "changed, humanized and democratized" from within (Heller); or a site of enacted resistance (the weak "poaching" on the property of the strong through tactics)? Mapping onto these is a deeper philosophical dispute, diagnosed by Claire Colebrook: does the everyday have a normative telos at all, or is it a discontinuous, "perverse," and always-technical domain that "refuses life"? The debate also connects to the internal tension in the everyday camp flagged on the linked pages.

Positions

Position A: de Certeau — The Everyday as Tactical Resistance

For de Certeau, the everyday is not a sphere of life but a set of practices — and its politics is resistance. "Users" of a culture, euphemistically called "consumers," are far from passive: they carry out a hidden, dispersed "production of consumption," poaching on the property of others and making do with what the dominant order imposes. His central opposition is between strategies (the calculus of the strong, who possess a "proper" place — proprietorship, enterprise, city, or building) and tactics (the cunning, time-dependent maneuvers of the weak, who "cannot count on a 'proper'" and must seize opportunities "on the wing"). Everyday practices — talking, reading, walking, shopping, cooking — are tactical, "victories of the 'weak' over the 'strong'." Walking is a "space of enunciation" that invents possibilities in the city, an "antidiscipline" against disciplinary power: "the ordinary practitioners of the city live 'down below'… they are walkers… whose bodies follow the thicks and thins of an urban 'text' they write without being able to read it." The everyday thus "invents itself by poaching in countless ways on the property of others." Key texts: The Practice of Everyday Life (de Certeau 1984) · Spatial Stories (1984/2006)

Position B: Lefebvre — The Everyday as Alienation and Critique

For Lefebvre, the everyday is not a neutral common ground but the sphere of alienation and its critique. Everyday life is "what is left over after all distinct, superior, specialized, structured activities have been singled out for analysis" — the residue philosophy has neglected — and under modern capitalism it is the target of a "bureaucratic society of controlled consumption": needs are manufactured, language is emptied by publicity, and daily living is administered. Yet the everyday is equally the site of potential liberation: Lefebvre proposes a "critique of everyday life" grounded in praxis and the "realization of philosophy," and holds up the festival and the theory of moments as models of a transformed everyday — "oriented towards a radical transformation of alienation." In Toward an Architecture of Enjoyment he extends this to habitation and an "architecture of enjoyment" (jouissance), refusing modernist asceticism: the existing "mode of production produces both its worst and its best." For Lefebvre the everyday is thus doubly the object of a systemic critique and of a utopian transformation. Key texts: Critique of Everyday Life (Lefebvre 1991) · Everyday Life in the Modern World (Lefebvre 1971) · Toward an Architecture of Enjoyment (Lefebvre 2014)

Position C: Felski — The Everyday as Common Ground, to be Affirmed

Felski turns against both the "hermeneutics of suspicion" (which over-politicizes the everyday as ideology) and the reverential valorization of the everyday, arguing instead for "making peace with the everyday." Drawing on the phenomenological/sociological tradition (Lefebvre, Heller, Schutz), she reconstructs the everyday through three facets: repetition (temporality), home (spatiality), and habit (modality). Against the tradition that treats these as inauthentic or backward, she affirms them: repetition "can signal resistance as well as enslavement" and "we become who we are through acts of repetition"; home is "an investment of meaning in space," a fixed point to which we return; habit is "the necessary precondition for impulse and innovation." She is, crucially, critical of her two interlocutors: Lefebvre (and others) coded the everyday/feminine as inauthentic, immanent, and backward, and the celebration of nomadism/mobility that underwrites de Certeau's pedestrian is, she argues, a masculinist metaphor. For Felski, "to recognize that we all inhabit everyday life is not to deny social differences but simply to acknowledge a common grounding in the mundane." Key texts: The Invention of Everyday Life (Felski 2000)

The central disagreement: These three positions contrast on two axes. (1) Value: Felski affirms the everyday as it is; Lefebvre treats it as alienated and in need of transformation; de Certeau treats it as already-active resistance. (2) Unit of analysis: de Certeau and, differently, Upton stress practice and the body; Lefebvre stresses structure (the managed totality of consumption); Felski stresses affect and experience (repetition, home, habit).

Additional Positions

Position D: Colebrook — The Everyday as the "Refusal of Life"

Colebrook offers a metadisciplinary critique of the whole field: both the dialectical/critical tradition (Aristotle to Schutz) and the immanent/utopian tradition (Nietzsche, Bergson, Deleuze & Guattari, Hardt & Negri) "owe a debt to the notion of life" — they assume life has a value and tends to its own actualization, whether through theoretical fulfillment or pure creative power. Against both, via de Certeau's tactics (la perruque) and Irigaray's critique of a masculine, self-expansive "life," she proposes reading the everyday as discontinuous and perverse: "It is precisely because everyday life offers no norm or principle, because it is so often perverse that it evidences the persistence of nonlife in life." "The everyday is not a milieu of common opinion; nor is it the eruption of 'life.' It is a constant and overwhelming refusal of life." Key texts: The Politics and Potential of Everyday Life (Colebrook 2002)

Position E: Vaneigem — The Everyday as Revolution

Vaneigem radicalizes Lefebvre's transformative program into a demand for revolutionary transformation of the everyday. Distinguishing survival (life reduced to the servicing of the commodity) from living (self-realization, communication, participation), he locates power in "a sum of constraints, mediations and seductions" and insists the everyday is the privileged terrain of consciousness: "There are more truths in twenty-four hours of a man's life than in all the philosophies." His program of creativity and subjectivity culminates in the rallying cry "Life First," and he warns of recuperation — the commodity system absorbs critique into "critical" spectacle. His revolutionary demand sits uneasily against de Certeau's soberer "tactics." Key texts: The Revolution of Everyday Life (Vaneigem 2001)

Position F: Upton — The Everyday as Habitus, to be Dissolved

Upton grounds the everyday materialistically, in the body rather than in language or ideology. Drawing on Bourdieu, he defines everyday life as "the nexus of spaces and times that repeatedly trigger bodily habits and cultural memories — the habitus," and insists "the unpredictability of the habitus means that no one can control the everyday." His conclusion dissolves the very category: understanding the everyday through embodied habit and organized time/space "reincorporates Architecture into the larger landscape" and ultimately lets us "relinquish the concept of the everyday" and its high/low hierarchy. Upton thus runs closer to de Certeau (practice, the body) than to Lefebvre's structural critique, but ends by abolishing the oppositions that structure Positions A–C. Key texts: Architecture in Everyday Life (Upton 2002)

Position G: Thompson — The Everyday as the Imaginary of the Administered Society

From political economy, Thompson stresses the imaginary dimension of the everyday and its contemporary political fate. The everyday is a "residual," but modern "administrative society" is producing a constitutionalization of everyday life — a multiplication of micro-constitutional orders that organize our lives around "a pervasive injunction to perform" and constitute a new form of "Real Citizenship." "Desire drives the everyday." Thompson thus shifts the frame from resistance/affirmation to the governance of everyday life, connecting the debate to Foucault/Lefebvre's administered everyday and to the noopolitical strand in Geoffrey's framework. Key texts: What is 'Everyday Life'? (Thompson 2013)

Position H: Berger & Luckmann — The Everyday as Paramount Reality (to be Described)

Berger & Luckmann offer the neutral, descriptive baseline the other positions revalue. The everyday is "paramount reality" — an ordered, objectified world whose phenomena are "prearranged in patterns that seem to be independent of our understanding of them and impose themselves upon us," taken for granted as "self-evident and compelling facticity." It is maintained through typification (which becomes progressively anonymous away from face-to-face interaction), language/objectivation, and the social stock of knowledge (dominated by "recipe knowledge"). This is neither alienation (Lefebvre), nor resistance (de Certeau), nor affirmation (Felski) — it is the sociological description of the everyday's taken-for-grantedness that the critical and affirmative theorists then diagnose, celebrate, or refuse. Key texts: The Social Construction of Reality (Berger & Luckmann 1966)

Position I: Blanchot — The Everyday as the Non-Event (to be Refused as Unrepresentable)

Blanchot figures the everyday as the non-event, "without a subject" — "Nothing happens. This is the everyday." It is a region of speech where "the determinations true and false… do not apply," the movement by which man "holds himself back in human anonymity." Against Lefebvre's transformation and de Certeau's tactics, Blanchot reads the everyday's infinity as a negative/destructive potential, refusing to represent it except as radically unrepresentable. The everyday "holds the principle of its own critique." This is the most radical refusal of the field's affirmative and transformative projects. Key texts: Cultural Phenomenology and the Everyday (Clucas 2000) (which expounds Blanchot) · The Moving Ground (Driscoll 2001)

Position J: Driscoll — The Everyday as a Disciplinary Construction (to be Exposed)

Driscoll offers a metacritique of the object itself. Cultural studies, in taking up de Certeau, constitutes the everyday as the unknowable Other of culture (via Lacan) — "the cultural activity of the non-producers of culture, an activity that is unsigned, unreadable and unsymbolized" — and grounds its own authorization by positing the everyday as an "unconscious" system of meaning. The everyday is "already arguably organized (placed) by either its exclusion from 'cultural analysis' or its placement as an object for cultural studies." Driscoll asks whether the everyday can be rethought as "the practice of the subject through the position of everyday life" without the psychologized model of the Unconscious or the place of the Other. This parallels Colebrook's and Upton's dissolution of the category from a disciplinary-psychoanalytic angle. Key texts: The Moving Ground: Locating Everyday Life (Driscoll 2001)

Position K: Seigworth & Gardiner — The Everyday as Open Totality and Affective Process

Seigworth & Gardiner read Lefebvre's theory of moments and rhythmanalysis through Leibniz's vinculum substantiale, treating the everyday as an "open totality" that "reconstitutes itself in each moment" rather than a closed, assimilative whole. The monad becomes "the moment," and the everyday is an affective, more-than-human process of mattering — "always more-than-human," including the inorganic, incorporeal, and nonhuman. They connect this to the biopolitical turn and critique cultural studies' "articulation" for capturing only the "bony" skeleton of the social rather than its "soft tissue" — the immanent, substantial bond of life. This is a contemporary, affective revaluation of Lefebvre that pushes the everyday toward the biopolitical/noopolitical. Key texts: Rethinking Everyday Life (Seigworth & Gardiner 2004)

Position L: Conroy / Garfinkel — The Everyday as Practical Accomplishment (to be Studied Ethnomethodologically)

Conroy stages the everyday's practice-theory against ethnomethodology and cultural studies, asking whether ordinary actors are compliant "cultural dopes" or active, creative producers of meaning. Garfinkel's ethnomethodology rejects the "cultural dope" — the actor who produces society's stable features by complying with the common culture's "pre-established and legitimate alternatives of action" — and instead studies the "organized artful practices of everyday life," problematizing the "seen-but-unnoticed, taken-for-granted background expectancies" of practice. The practical actor operates as a "lay sociologist." Conroy argues Garfinkel's critique "might just as easily be directed toward critical theory," which remains tied to dualistic pairings of action/structure and rulers/ruled. He concludes by advocating methodological eclecticism (semiotic, ethnomethodological, ethnographic) and affirming that actors, if ever "doped," can emerge from that stupor to act creatively and meaningfully. Key texts: Culturally 'Doped' or Not? (Conroy)

Position M: Bourdieu — The Everyday as the Site of the Habitus (to be Explained by the Theory of Practice)

Bourdieu supplies the sociological foundation of the everyday that the philosophical/cultural-theory positions (A–L) presuppose but do not theorize. The everyday is produced and reproduced through the habitus — durable, transposable dispositions inculcated in the body that generate practice as "regulated improvisation" without conscious rule-following or calculation. Against both objectivism (the everyday as execution of a model/code) and subjectivism (the everyday as free, unprecedented project), Bourdieu insists practice follows a "practical logic" — economical, fuzzy, temporal — oriented by a "feel for the game," illusio, and doxa, and structured by misrecognized symbolic capital. This grounds (and partly dissolves) the field's central question: rather than affirming, transforming, or resisting the everyday, Bourdieu explains its reproduction through the incorporated body, while leaving open (via the "unpredictability of the habitus," as Upton stresses) whether its reproduction can be refused. Key texts: Outline of a Theory of Practice (Bourdieu 1977) · The Logic of Practice (Bourdieu 1990) · Bourdieu for Architects (Webster 2011)

Position N: Maycroft — The Everyday as Empirically Grounded, Work-Attenuated (to be Described from Small Details)

Maycroft offers an empirical corrective to the philosophical and cultural-theory positions (A–M). His core argument is that "the politics of everyday life are just as fruitfully approached through empirical study as they are via philosophical or cultural contemplation." He warns against two pitfalls: (1) philosophically/culturally driven accounts that "fail to take account of the 'reality' of everyday life as experienced by the very people on who's behalf they often argue"; and (2) "theories in search of a validating detail" that claim to build from small details but actually select details to support pre-existing theoretical models. His empirical case study (the removal of a train service) shows how "work increasingly frames everyday life" — commuters had to get up earlier, pay 25% more in fares, endure overcrowding, and waste time, such that "everyday life was framed a little more by the imperatives of work." Maycroft's conclusion is sobering: for many, everyday life is "at most a respite from non-everyday life pressures" and "increasingly apt to speak of resistance to everyday life" rather than resistance from it. This position runs closest to Lefebvre's colonization thesis but grounds it empirically rather than philosophically. Key texts: Everyday life in the real world (Maycroft 2007)

Position O: Heller — The Everyday as Particularity's Terrain, to be Humanized from Within

Heller supplies the debate's most systematic transform position — but with a structural twist that separates her from Lefebvre. She accepts Heidegger's analysis of alienated everydayness and Lefebvre's alienation critique, yet denies that the everyday's structure causes alienation: "I deny however that everyday life must necessarily be alienated. In the final analysis, the reason for the alienation of the everyday world is not its structure, but those social relationships by virtue of which an alienated relationship with everyday life becomes the typical relationship." The everyday is the aggregate of individual reproduction factors making social reproduction possible; its built-in framework (species-essential objectivation 'in itself' — tools, custom, language; repetitive praxis; pragmatic, probabilistic, analogical thinking) is neither good nor bad, merely necessary. Transformation therefore cannot be performed "on the macro-scale alone": it requires the change of human attitudes, the generalization of the attitude she calls 'individual personality' — persons who consciously relate to species-essential values and order (hierarchize) their everyday life accordingly, knowing "where to abandon repetition," when pragmatism must yield to theory, when over-generalization becomes prejudice. The practical aim: everyday life "can be changed, humanized and democratized, in spite of the constancy of some of its patterns" — a challenge "intended as… to the Heideggerian position." Key texts: Everyday Life (Heller 1970)

Position P: Teyssot — The Everyday as Psychic Cushion, Suppressed at the Peril of the Subject

Teyssot's chapter adds the debate's psychological position — the everyday evaluated by what its loss does to the psyche. The frame is the editors' headnote: "Psychological disturbance, whether from disease, deprivation, or suppression of the comforting habitual and repetitious nature of everyday life, forms the subject of Georges Teyssot's essay" (p. 345). Where Lefebvre diagnoses the everyday's colonization and Felski affirms its habits, Teyssot makes the everyday load-bearing: the "comforting habitual and repetitious" is what psyches live inside, and its suppression is pathogenic on a par with disease and deprivation. The position's architectural twist: the everyday's disturbance also arrives by excess — the interior that over-serves the habitual ("this mirrored interiority… protects too much," p. 346) breeds boredom, the everyday's own enclosure turning against its cushion-function. The position is structurally Felski-adjacent (repetition affirmed) but psychological rather than feminist in warrant, and it gives the debate its clinical criterion: any theory or design of the everyday must preserve, or answer for suppressing, the habitual's comfort. Key texts: Boredom and Bedroom (Teyssot 1996/2006)

Position Q: Alltagsgeschichte — The Everyday as Historically Reconstructed Experience (to be Recovered from Below)

The German history of everyday life enters the debate not as a philosophy of the everyday but as a historiographical method for reconstructing it. Its object is "the life and survival of those who have remained largely anonymous in history—the 'nameless' multitudes" (Lüdtke, p. 4); its premise is that "actions and experience cannot be separated from the context of their genesis and impact" (p. 5); and its finding, against both the celebratory and the critical poles, is that workers under fascism neither resisted nor consented but practised complaisance punctuated by Eigensinn — "self-willed movements of evasion" that "remained integrated into calculated work" (pp. 226–228). The everyday here is not a sphere to affirm (Felski), transform (Lefebvre), or resist (de Certeau) but the reconstructed texture of experience under determinate conditions — "though given, [conditions] are in equal measure a product" (p. 7). It thus supplies the debate with its historical-methodological wing and its sharpest political test: a history of the everyday that can hold "perpetrators, accomplices, and victims" in one frame without exonerating any of them (p. 24). Key texts: The History of Everyday Life (Lüdtke ed. 1995)

Key Texts

Current State

The everyday camp is best read as a field held together by a shared object and pulled apart by conflicting valuations. Felski's affirmation directly rebuts Lefebvre's charge that the everyday is alienated and inauthentic (a coding she reads as gendered), and rejects de Certeau's masculinist celebration of mobility; de Certeau's tactical reading and Lefebvre's structural critique in turn diverge on whether resistance is local practice or systemic transformation. Colebrook's meta-critique threatens all three by denying the everyday any normative telos, and Upton dissolves the category altogether through the habitus, while Thompson and Vaneigem pull the everyday's politics toward, respectively, contemporary governance and revolutionary refusal. The new sources deepen the field's self-questioning: Berger & Luckmann supply the neutral, descriptive baseline (the everyday as "paramount reality") that the critical and affirmative positions revalue; Blanchot refuses representation of the everyday as radically unrepresentable; Driscoll exposes the everyday as a disciplinary construction that cultural studies constitutes as an unknowable Other; Seigworth & Gardiner revalue the everyday as an affective, more-than-human "open totality"; Conroy/Garfinkel offer an ethnomethodological alternative that rejects the "cultural dope" model of the actor; Bourdieu (via Upton and Webster) supplies the sociological foundation of the everyday as the site of the habitus and practical logic, explaining its reproduction through the incorporated body rather than affirming, transforming, or resisting it; and Maycroft offers an empirical corrective, grounding Lefebvre's colonization thesis in concrete observation of how work frames everyday life and suggesting "resistance to everyday life" rather than resistance from it. Madigan & Munro add the debate's consumer-agency strand in its domestic, class-specific form: consumers are neither "victims" (the critical pole they acknowledge) nor free players of signs (the postmodern pole they correct — "easily overdrawn," p. 224), but households whose contradictions ("consumerism is something to be rejected and yet to be seen as out-of-date, or old-fashioned is a personal condemnation," p. 226) are themselves the data. Nobody has reconciled "making peace" with "critique" with "tactics" with "refusal" with "description" with "practical accomplishment" with "habitus" with "empirical grounding"; whether the everyday is affirmed, transformed, resisted, refused, described, dissolved, explained, or empirically grounded remains the open question of this field. The editorial survey of Yoka & Paschalidis (2015) confirms this cartography from the semiotic-hermeneutic side — framing the volume as a "third generation" of cultural studies that negotiates semiotic tools and hermeneutics — and adds Barthes' "neutral" (via Vergopoulos) as a further candidate for what the everyday is: a category that "passes with the semiotic to go beyond the semiotic." Heller's primary text (Position O) sharpens the transformation pole: she shares Lefebvre's alienation critique but locates the everyday's openness to change in its structure (the sphere of objectivation 'in itself' is neither good nor bad), making the individual's hierarchized conduct of life — not macro-revolution alone — the medium of transformation. Her distinction from Schütz (the everyday is not an attitude but "the objective fundament of every social action") also draws the line between this debate and the phenomenological positions (H, I) more precisely than before.

Rachel Carley's chapter (2018) adds the debate's design-educational uptake — the everyday not as position to hold but as material to design with: the Perec/Oulipian studio method makes students acknowledge "the life of the interior of a building in time: activated by the extraordinary events and ordinary rituals and performances of everyday life," with the infra-ordinary and the outlandish "artfully combined" in the constraint-armature (infra-ordinary, voluntary-constraints). The move is Felski-compatible (the everyday's rituals affirmed as design's working material rather than diagnosed as alienation) but proceduralizes her affirmation: the everyday enters the studio as compulsory lists of objects, gestures, and situations — the everyday recovered by constraint rather than by peace with habit.

Perec's own "The Apartment" (1974/2006) — the debate's primary literary document, now ingested — stages both the administered and the counter-everyday at apartment scale. Its nycthemeral timetable is the administered everyday in plan form: "in the ideal dividing-up of today's apartments functionality functions in accordance with a procedure that is unequivocal, sequential and nycthemeral… The activities of the day correspond to slices of time, and to each slice of time there corresponds one room of the apartment" — a day that is "fictional and problematic" yet "elementarily right," because "it is nevertheless like that, and not otherwise, that architects and town planners see us as living or want us to live" (a colonization thesis in plan form, Lefebvre-compatible but located in the design professions rather than in consumption: see colonization-of-everyday-life, nycthemeral). Against it Perec proposes four counter-layouts — the reception en suite, the sensory apartment, the heptadian weekday-rooms, the themed rooms — "hardly any more transgressive," he says, than what exists: the everyday's alternatives as a family of arbitrary constraints rather than a politics. The move is the debate's methodological wing made spatial: where Maycroft demands empirical study and Conroy ethnomethodological description, Perec demands enumeration and counter-procedure — the everyday answered not with a position but with a layout.

Norman Potter's chapter (1990/2006) — the debate's design-side counter-programme, now ingested — completes the arc Perec opened: the same administered everyday, named at its most basic instrument. Potter's target is the "highly generalised and frictionless modern kitchen in which time and labour saving comes first" — the labour-saving script as the design profession's own contribution to everyday-life administration (the continuous kitchen's "unbroken flow," the timetable's kitchen slots) — and his counter is a kitchen designed to carry the everyday's domestic temporality: "the taking of food being a prime agent of precisely that [continuity]. There is nothing really instant about food; although meals are pretty basic, there is process, ritual, and continuity involved, and I think this kitchen had the feel of that." The move is Felski-affirming but Lefebvre-aware: the meal's repetition and ritual are the everyday's continuity-work, to be valued (Felski's repetition "can signal resistance as well as enslavement") and designed for, not optimized away — with efficiency re-founded rather than rejected ("The Penton kitchen is efficient to the extent that it gives pleasure"). Where Perec answers the administered everyday with counter-layouts, Potter answers it with an instrument: the debate gains its first built example of the everyday's defence — the room designed for valued practice rather than saved minutes (see kitchen, work-leisure-distinction).

Relevance to Geoffrey's Research

This debate is the theoretical core of Geoffrey's The Everyday research area — the explicit internal dialogue of de Certeau, Lefebvre, and Felski that the Everyday Life cluster otherwise distributes across separate concept pages. It supplies the critical apparatus for reading Everyday Architecture and Dwelling: whether ordinary building and dwelling are affirmed (Felski), diagnosed as colonized (Lefebvre), tactically re-appropriated (de Certeau), or dissolved into habitus (Upton) changes how the everyday is set against the spectacular/iconic economy (see The Everyday vs. Iconic Architecture). Colebrook's "refusal of life" and Thompson's account of an administered everyday also connect the debate to Geoffrey's neoliberalism & architecture and noopolitics threads.

Links to this page:

  1. Quiet Research Wiki
  2. Blanchot, Maurice
  3. Conroy, Tom
  4. Driscoll, Catherine
  5. Garfinkel, Harold
  6. Heller, Agnes
  7. Maycroft, Neil
  8. Seigworth, Gregory J. & Gardiner, Michael E.
  9. Virilio, Paul
  10. Colonization of Everyday Life
  11. Consumption (Sign Manipulation)
  12. Empirical Methods
  13. Ethic of Labor and Esthetic of Play
  14. Everyday Life
  15. Form-Sign
  16. Habit
  17. Revolution as Finality
  18. The Neutral
  19. Alltagsgeschichte vs. Historical Social Science
  20. Debates — Index
  21. The System of Objects
  22. The Mirror of Production
  23. The Social Construction of Reality (Ch. 1–3)
  24. Outline of a Theory of Practice
  25. The Logic of Practice
  26. Puzzle
  27. Cultural Phenomenology and the Everyday
  28. Culturally 'Doped' or Not?: On Ethnomethodology, Critical Theory and the Exegesis of Everyday Life Practices
  29. Design and Order in Everyday Life
  30. Spatial Stories
  31. The Moving Ground: Locating Everyday Life
  32. Everyday Life
  33. Social, Spatial and Temporal Factors
  34. The History of Everyday Life: Reconstructing Historical Experiences and Ways of Life
  35. 'House Beautiful': Style and Consumption in the Home
  36. Everyday life in the real world
  37. The Design of Everyday Things
  38. Bourdieu and Marx: Practices of Critique
  39. The Apartment
  40. The Kitchen as a Place to Be
  41. Rethinking Everyday Life: And Then Nothing Turns Itself Inside Out
  42. Habit and Inhabit, Stuff and Trash
  43. Architecture for Everyday Life
  44. Decorating Culture
  45. Politicizing the Interior
  46. Boredom and Bedroom: The Suppression of the Habitual
  47. The Aesthetics of Disappearance
  48. Home: Territory and Identity
  49. Semiotics and Hermeneutics of the Everyday
  50. Consumerism, Capitalism, and Iconic Architecture
  51. Definitions of the Everyday: A Taxonomy
  52. The Everyday as the Site of Postcapitalist Desire
  53. Heidegger's Dwelling, Genius Loci, and the Everyday
  54. How the Everyday Defeats Iconic Architecture
  55. Picnolepsy and the Everyday: Absence, the Infra-Ordinary, and the Continuity of the Quotidian
  56. The Quotidian and the Everyday: Synonym, Concept, or Modern Condition?
  57. The Historical Acceptance of “The Everyday” as a Concept in Modern Thought
  58. The History of the Everyday
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